Empirical analysis and the metaphysics of causation -Chapter 1 handout -
The method of empirical analysis
To conduct the empirical analysis of some topic X, overly broadly speaking, is to identify scientifically improved concepts of X. Empirical analysis is a form of conceptual analysis in the broad sense that it provides a link between our ordinary conception of X and things in the world, but it is a non-standard form of conceptual analysis by forging the linkage in a manner especially responsive to scientific theorizing and experimental results. (p. 3) The empirical analysis of X is the engineering of a conceptual framework optimized in the service of the scientific explanation of whatever empirical phenomena motivate our possession of a concept of X, especially insofar as they are characterized in terms of experiments. (p.10) NOT IMPORTANT: "Evaluate our mutually shared folk concept X from the armchair"
IMPORTANT: "to take what data science provides and to organize that data from the armchair to arrive at superior surrogates for X" (while accommodating paradigm cases of the folk concept) wide enough so that new empirical results don't invalidate it (e.g. classical concept of energy still applies in the context of thermodynamics etc.)
Must be narrow enough so that outlandish possibilities are ignored (e.g. the metaphysics of magic) -we stay in close possible worlds Example 1. Food science introduces the general concept of nutrient, defined as any type of ingested substance. In folk parlance, dirt isn't typically food, but as far as food science is concerned, it can be a nutrient (although not a very effective one for humans).
Example 2: Mathematics generalizes our concept of rotation into the following function (in 2D, assuming rotation of  degrees anti-clockwise):
( ) → ( cos − sin cos + sin )
A consequence of this definition is that the case of  = 0 ("null rotation") also qualifies as a rotation.
In contrast, in (orthodox) conceptual analyses of X, the goal is to systematize the platitudes that constitute our implicit concept of X. "There is no further systematic method (beyond custom, personal preference, and appeasing journal referees) for adjudicating between competing analyses".
(1) Take the platitudes concerning X as a starting point (2) Formulate explicit experiments whose results clarify why X has some conceptual utility (e.g. [later in the book] the promotion experiment, the backtracking experiment, and the asymmetry experiment).
"If an optimal, or at least adequate, set of concepts can be developed that help to explain [all these components of our intuitive concept], then the metaphysics of causation will be largely solved." p.17
The empirical analysis of causation has 3 layers:
Goal: "Optimize metaphysical concepts in accord with the demands of fundamental reality and non-metaphysical concepts in accord with the demands of folk psychology or epistemology."
FOLK PLATITUDES
those bearing on X insofar as it is something "out there in reality"
those bearing on how we think about X in ways that go beyond the empirical phenomena in the first group part of the METAPHYSICS of X part of the PSYCHOLOGY and EPISTEMOLOGY of X In the case of causation: Problem: Fundamental reality includes much more stuff than our typical causal claims (ordinary or scientific) acknowledge.
>> we switch from probability-fixing to probability-raising and from token causation to type causation in the middle layer "Imagine a magnetic compass lying undisturbed. By moving a lodestone near the compass [C], one can reliably make the compass needle move [E].
[...] Our belief that C caused E is in part a belief that the lodestone part of the world was somehow a more important part of the vast C* [= all the microphysical facts at the time when C occurred] than all the far flung events that seemingly have nothing to do with the motion of the compass needle. What makes C the important part of C*, I claim, is that the probability that C* fixes for the effect is significantly greater than the probability that would be fixed for the effect by events that are just like C* except that the physics instantiating the movement of the lodestone is hypothetically altered to make the lodestone remain at rest." (p.23)
The metaphysical picture, boiled down to its essence, is that there is some sort of fundamental reality instantiating relations of determination or probability-fixing among microscopically detailed events and a more abstract or fuzzy construal of reality where events of type C raise the probability of events of type E. (p.24)
The concept of fundamental reality
(1) Fundamentality is reality. "The way things are fundamentally is the way things really are."
(2) The fundamental is the basis. "Fundamental reality is the only real basis for how things stand derivatively."
(3) The fundamental is determinate. "Fundamental reality is as determinate as reality ever gets."
(4) The fundamental is consistent.
Note: No talk of "levels" of reality, not assuming microreduction. 
Status of ordinary mesoscale objects:
(i) Part of fundamental reality (FR) if they are mere sums of particles.
(ii) Not part of FR if they can change parts.
(iii) Not part of FR if the fundamental entities are strings or other exotic structures.
Derivative quantitites
"A quantity is derivative if its magnitude requires some specification beyond the totality of fundamental reality (and beyond any specification required to locate the quantity in fundamental reality)." E.g. in the classical picture, mass is fundamental, kinetic energy is derivative.
Fundamentally arbitrary quantities: e.g. states of rest.
Definition of derivative quantitites
A quantity Q D is derivative iff Example: the thermal energy of particles is a function of their fundamental properties plus a fundamentally arbitrary parameter that fixes macroscopic objects that the particles are assumed to compose.
Strict vs relaxed standards
A theory obeys strict standards iff its principles make contrary predictions about realistic possibilities. A theory obeys relaxed standards otherwise. Not a problem because a theory in the special sciences is "a theory of derivative reality that is only approximate and relies on additional resources of fundamental reality to adjudicate what is fundamentally going on."
Example 2:
On our intuitive conception, (i) causation is transitive and (ii) causes raise the probability of their effects. But these two principles contradict each other.
"By the relaxed standards appropriate to most special sciences, including the kind of psychology concerned with modeling people's responses to questions about what caused what, it is acceptable for a theory to claim that people employ both [principles] as rough-and-ready heuristics for assessing the existence of a causeeffect relation." (47) thermal energy of the particles relative to the net motion of A and B, respectively (plus the mechanical energy of the blocks) thermal energy of the particles relative to the total system (the "sum" of A and B)
